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1 See generally Kurt Eggert, Truth in Toward Consumer Protection 
in the 63 MD. L. REV. 217, 224-32 (2004) (discussing the 
scope of problem gambling and its economic and social effects). 
2 E.g., id. at 225 ("[A]bout 3.85% of A.mericans will be problem 
during their lifetime, that 1.6% will be pathological gamblers during their 
lifetime, and that 2.8% are ... problem while l.14% are current 
... probable pathological gamblers." (citing Howard J. Shaffer et Estimating 
the Prevalence of Disordered Gambling Behavior in the United States & Canada: 
A Meta-Analysis, HARV. MED. SCH. DIV. ON ADDICTION (Dec. 15, 1997)); ROBERT 
J. WILLIAMS ET AL, THE POPULATION PREVALENCE OF PROBLEM GAMBLJNG: 
METHODOLOGICAL INFLUENCES, STANDARDIZED RATES, JURISDICTIONAL 
DIFFERENCES & WORLDWIDE TRENDS 5 (2012) (noting that, internationally, 
problem gambling rates range from 0.5% to 7.6% and depicting adult prevalence 
rates of problem gambling among states and territories in the U. available at 
https://www .uleth.ca/dspace/bitstream/handle/l 0133/3068/2012-PREV ALENCE-
OPGRC%20%282%29 .pdf?sequence=3; Problem Gambling, HARV. MENTAL 
HEALTH LETTER (March 2004), available at http://wwvv.health.harvard.edu/ 
newsweek/Problem_gambling.htm (noting that "about 1 % of American adults-
nearly 3 million people-are pathological gamblers" and "[a]nother 2%-3% have 
less serious but still significant problems, and as many as 15 million are at risk"); 
Casino Expansion and Its Impact on Pathological & Problem Gambling 
Prevalence Rates, AM. GAMING Ass'N,http://www.americangaming.org/industry-
resources/research/fact-sheets/history··problem-gambling-prevalence-rates 
visited June 30, 2015) (depicting the prevalence of problem and pathological 
gambling from 1976 through 2008, in which 2.3 % and 0.6 % of the United States 
population were problem and pathological gamblers, respectively). Although these 
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phenomenon,3 it is indisputable that persons unable to control their gambling 
can bring rninous consequences upon themselves and others.4 Stories abound 
about lawyers losing their licenses because they divert funds from client funds 
to feed their gambling habits.5 People are stunned when a Monsignor 
embezzles $650,000 from his church to support a video poker addiction. 6 
Stories like these bring problem gambling into stark relief. The consequences 
of problem gambling may not be limited to the gambler; problem gambling 
may represent one of the most serious threats to the vitality, and certainly the 
growth, of the gaming industry itself. 7 If there is a perception that the industry 
statistics appear similar at first blush, when taken in the aggregate, the difference in 
numbers of problem and pathological gamblers nationwide is significant. This 
Article will not analyze the issue of how many problem gamblers there are in the 
United States. Instead, it assumes there are sufficient numbers to constitute a public 
policy issue and to warrant attention. 
3 There are a number of terms used in this setting. Examples include 
"pathological gambling," "problem gambling," and "gambling disorder." See, e.g., 
AM. GAMING Ass'N, supra note 2 (using the terms "problem gambling" and 
"pathological gambling"); AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 585 (5th ed. 2013) (using the term "gambling 
disorder"). In this Article, the term "problem gambling" will typically be used 
unless the discussion is making specific reference to other terminology. 
4 See, e.g., N.Y. Council on Problem Gambling, The Faces Problem 
Gambling, KNOW THE ODDS, http://knowtheodds.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/ 
KTO _FacesOfPG.pdf (last visited June 30, 2015). 
5 See, e.g., Francis McCabe, Suspended Lawyer Avoids Prison in Gambling 
Case, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/ 
crime-courts/ suspended-lawyer-avoids-prison-gambling-case (discussing the story 
of Nevada attorney Doug Crawford, who was suspended from practice for five 
years for "gambling away more than $300,000 of his clients' money"); Trish 
Mehaffey, Disbarred Cedar Rapids Lawyer Pleads Guilty to Wire Fraud in 
Federal Court, GAZETTE (Oct. 20, 2014), http://thegazette.com/subject/news/public 
-safety/crime/fraud/disbarred-cedar-rapids-lawyer-pleads-guilty-to-wire-fraud-in-
federal-court-20141020 (discussing the story of Iowa attorney Susan Hense, "who 
stole more than $800,000 from clients" to fuel her gambling addiction). 
6 Ken Ritter, Kevin McAuliffe, Vegas Priest, Arrives at Texas Federal Prison 
for Stealing $650,000, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 14, 2012, 1:19 PM), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/14/vegas-priest-goes-to-prison_ n _1425696.html. 
7 It has often been said that problem gambling is the "Achilles Heel" of 
legalized gambling. See, e.g., Torana Granston, Gambling Addiction: An Achilles 
Heel for Locals, TODAY ST. MAARTEN (July 26, 2012, 12:44 PM), http://www. 
todaysxm.com/2012/071261 gambling-addiction-an-achilles-heel-for-locals; Michael 
Jonas, The Casino Debate's Achilles' Heel: "Problem Gamblers" Account for a 
Disproportionate Share of Casino Revenues, COMMONWEALTH (Sept. 15, 2011), 
http://www .commonwealthmagazine.org/V oices/Back-Story/2011/Summer/011 Othe-
casino-debates-Achilles-heel.aspx. 
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is insensitive to the issue or, worse, is taking advantage of these people, the 
popular reaction could be damaging. 
Among the mechanisms that have been developed to address problem 
gambling is self-exclusion, a process by which a gambler signs a form banning 
him from gambling.8 The exclusion form may be executed with and limited to 
an individual casino;9 or, a state regulatory body may administer the process 
with application to all licensed facilities in that jurisdiction.10 Twenty-three 
states have self-exclusion programs (SEPs) of some type for casino gambling. 11 
In several instances, the casinos involved are tribal casinos and the self-
exclusion process could be a component of the compacting process under the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). 12 The specifics of the SEPs vary 
considerably between jurisdictions. 13 Even with these variations, however, 
SEPs have many common characteristics and similar objectives. 14 
SEPs should be encouraged, because they represent an opportunity for the 
problem gambler to take responsibility for his or her actions. Indeed, there is 
evidence that SEPs can be a helpful part of the effort to address problem 
8 See, e.g., Self-Exclusion Program, IOWA GAMING Ass'N, http://www.iowa 
gaming.org/responsible _gaming/self-exclusion.aspx (last visited June 30, 2015); 
Voluntmy Exclusion Program Frequently Asked Questions, Mo. GAMING COMM'N, 
http://www.mgc.dps.mo.gov/DAP/dap_faq.html (last visited June 30, 2015); Self 
Exclusion Program FAQ, PA. GAMING CONTROL BD., http://gamingcontrolboard.pa 
.gov/?p=67 (last visited June 30, 2015). 
9 See, e.g., Responsible Gaming, REMINGTON PARK RACING CASINO, http:// 
www.remingtonpark.com/Casino/Responsible _Gaming/ (last visited June 30, 
2015); Responsible Gambling, TWIN RIVER CASINO, http://www.twinriver.com/ 
casino/responsible-gambling/ (last visited June 30, 2015). 
10 See, e.g., IOWA GAMING Ass'N, Iowa Statewide and Lifetime Self-Exclusion 
Form, available at http://www.iowagaming.org/support/pdf/Self-Exclusion _Form. 
pdf (July 1, 2011); IND. GAMING COMM'N, Request for Enrollment in the Voluntary 
Exclusion (YEP), available at http://www.in.gov/igc/files/vep-application 
-sample.pdf (last visited June 2015). 
11 See infra Appendix (detailing the self-exclusion programs offered by states). 
12 See, e.g., MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN AGUA CALIENTE BAND 
OF CAHUILLA INDIANS, A FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED INDIAN TRIBE, & THE STATE OF 
CALIFORNIA § 103 .1 ( c ), available at http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/documents/enabling/ 
2008/MOA%20Agua%20Caliente.pdf; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(l)(B)-(C) 
(specifying that casino games, termed Class III games by IGRA, can only be 
conducted on tribal lands in a state which "permits such gaming," and only 
pursuant to a compact between the state and the tribe); see also 25 U.S.C. 
§ 270l(d)(3)(A)-(C) (suggesting that terms relating to problem gambling are 
appropriate subjects of compact negotiation between the state and the tribe). 
13 See generally infra Appendix. 
14 See id. 
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gambling. 15 However, as will be discussed, for SEPs to be effective they need 
to be integrated into an ethos of treatment for problem gamblers, and not used 
as a mechanism for punishment. 16 Moreover, regardless of the details and 
structure of SEPs, they are not panaceas, and their effectiveness should not be 
overstated. 17 This Article will consider some of the limitations of SEPs as a 
way of addressing problem gambling. While SEPs can be useful in the efforts 
to combat problem gambling, their use should not detract from other important 
steps that can-and perhaps should-be taken to diminish the incidence of this 
undesirable effect of regulated gambling. 18 
H. BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURE OF SEPS 
The first SEP in the United States was developed in Missouri in 1996 "in 
response to a citizen's request to be banned from the state's excursion gambling 
boats because he found himself unable to control his gambling."19 According to 
then Executive Director of the Missouri Gaming Commission, as the Missouri 
program was developed, some members of the "treatment community" argued 
15 See Sarah E. Nelson et al., One Decade of Self Exclusion: Missouri Casino 
Self Excluders Four to Ten Years After Enrollment, 26 J. GAMBLING STUD. 129, 
130 (20 l 0) (citing Robert Ladouceur et al., Analysis of a Casino's Self-Exclusion 
Program, 16 J. GAMBLING STUD. 453 (2000); Robert Ladouceur et aL, Self-
Exclusion Program: A Longitudinal Evaluation Study, 23 J. GAMBLING STUD. 85 
(2007)). 
16 See infra notes 43, 47-49, 61 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 48, 50 and accompanying text; see generally Nelson et al., 
supra note 15, at 130-31, 135-37 (discussing the effectiveness of SEPs). 
18 See, e.g., Amaia Guenaga, Note, Improving the Odds: Changing the 
Perception of Problem Gambling and Supporting the Growth of Problem Gambling 
Courts, 2 UNLV GAMING L.J. 133, 142--47 (2011) (discussing the inception of 
problem gambling courts to assist gamblers in ameliorating their addictions); 
Advocacy, NAT'L COUNCIL ON PROBLEM GAMBLING, http://www.ncpgambling.org/ 
programs-resources/advocacy/ (last visited June 30, 2015) (stating that the National 
Council on Problem Gambling "advocat[es] for programs and services to assist 
problem gamblers and their families" focusing on "prevention, education, 
treatment, enforcement, and research"). This Article will focus on SEPs that states 
have for casinos and similar forms of gambling. It will not address programs 
offered by state lotteries or tribal casinos. For a brief discussion of the issues 
inherent in lottery exclusion programs, see Whitney Woodward, Gamblers Can Opt 
Out of Big Lotto Jackpots, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 17, 2007), http://articles.chicagotribune. 
com/2007-10-17/news/0710160645_1 _lottery-tickets-scratch-off-tickets-illinois-
lottery (discussing an Illinois state program designed to deter problem gamblers 
from buying lottery tickets). 
19 Self-Exclusion 101, AM. GAMING Ass'N (Jan. 1, 2003), https://web.archive. 
org/web/20141120084930/http://www.americangaming.org/newsroom/newsletters/ 
responsible-gaming-quarterly/self-exclusion- 10 l [hereinafter Self-Exclusion 1 01]. 
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that a SEP was a bad idea.20 
[Members of the treatment community] noted that while our intentions 
were good, the only way people can truly get better is if they take 
control and take on the responsibility for keeping themselves out of the 
casinos . . . . It is wrong to put the responsibility in the casino's hands 
because then the individual never really takes a step in acknowledging 
his problem or trying to fix it. And this allows him to ultimately blame 
the casino ifhe fails. 1 
33 
The emphasis of the Missouri program was that "the problem gambler 
agrees to accept responsibility for staying off excursion gambling boats by 
adding himself to the List of Disassociated Persons."22 A person on the list 
could be subject to arrest for trespass and other sanctions if he or she entered a 
casino.23 Under the program, casinos were obligated to remove enrollees from 
their direct marketing lists and deny them check cashing privileges and 
participation in players' clubs.24 Although a casino could be penalized for 
knowingly allowing such people to gamble, the Executive Director stated that, 
"[y]ou can't penalize a casino for the occasional screw-up in their database ... 
. That's just part of business."25 
Twenty-two states have followed Missouri's lead in establishing different 
forms of SEPs.26 SEPs have many common features. For example, all states 
require the gambler to apply for inclusion in the SEP, rather than allowing a 
request by the gambler's family members.27 Likewise, a hallmark of all SEPs is 
that privileges such as membership in loyalty programs, earning "comps,"28 
issuance of credit, and check cashing are lost.29 Most notably, the gambler in a 
20 See id. 
21 Id. (quoting then Executive Director of the Missouri Gaming Commission 
Kevin Mullally). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. (noting that before paying a jackpot of $1,200 or more, a casino had to 
see ifthe person was on the List of Disassociated Persons). 
24 Id. 
2s Id. 
26 See infra Appendix. 
27 See infra Appendix; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4834(a) (2014); 10-
200-203 DEL. ADMIN. CODE§ 7.16 (2015); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.745 
(2014); 68 IND. ADMIN. CODE 6-3-2(b) (West 2014); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 112-
112-5(a) (2014); LAADMIN. CODE tit. 42, § 304(C)(l)-(2) (2014). 
28 See Bill Burton, Comp Basics, ABOUT.COM, http://casinogambling.about. 
com/cs/comps/a/compbasic.htm (last visited June 30, 2015) ("Comps are freebies 
that the casino gives to its customers as a reward for their business. It is a way to .. 
. entice player loyalty to the establishment."). 
29 See infra Appendix; see, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.770(d) 
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SEP who violates the terms and returns to gamble agrees to forfeit any 
30 
There are some differences among SEPs, as well. One notable difference is 
the length of time for which the self-exclusion operates.31 Several states 
that a gambler who enrolls in a SEP is agreeing to a lifetime 
exclusion. 32 More common is a graduated approach where the term of 
exclusion can be one, three, five, or even ten years, with a lifetime exclusion 
also being available.33 
Another area of variation in state SEPs is whether a gambler who enrolls in 
the SEP can later change his or her mind and seek removal from the list Most 
states allow for "reinstatement" upon the petition of the gambler,34 or make 
reinstatement automatic upon the expiration of the term of the self-exclusion. 35 
Nevada-with its long history of gaming regulation--is a reference 
standard for nearly any gambling issue. Nevada's treatment of SEPs is 
especially notable. Because of the number of gaming venues in the state--both 
full casinos and licensees who have "restricted" licenses, which allow a limited 
number of electronic games to be offered36 -it is considered impractical to 
have a state administered program.37 Responsible gaming measures, 
(2014); KAN. ADMIN. REGS .. § l 12-l 12-8(b) (2015); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
27:27.l(C)(ll) (2014); 16-633-13 ME. CODER. § 6(3)(A) (2015). See also Self 
Exclusion, PROBLEM GAMBLING COAL. OF COLO., http://www.problemgambling 
colorado.org/content/self-exclusion (last visited June 30, 2015). 
30 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 432.225(4)(e)(ii) (West 2014); 13-003 
MISS. CODER.§ 10.l(a) (LexisNexis 2015); Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 11, § 45-
17.010(2)(B) (2015). 
31 See Appendix. 
32 e.g., IOWA CODE § 99F.4(22) (2015); MICH, COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
432.225(5) (West 2014); Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. tit 11, § 45-l 7.020(1)(A) (2015). 
33 See infra Appendix; see, e.g., DEL. LOTTERY, Request for Voluntary 
Exclusion from All Delaware Video Lottery Facilities, http://www.delottery.com/ 
pdfNideoLotterySelfExApp.pdf, at 1 (offering patrons the options to self-exclude 
for one year, five years, or lifetime); ME. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
Maine Se~f Exclusion Program, http://www.maine.gov/dhhs/samhs/osa/help/ 
gambling/selfexclusion ("A person can choose to self-exclude for 1 year, 3 years, 5 
years, or for lifetime. PROBLEM GAMBLING COAL. OF COLO., Casino 
Self-Exclusion Application & Waiver, available at http://www.coloradogaming. 
com/index.php/download_file/view/21 (offering patrons the options to self-exclude 
for three years, five years, ten years, or lifetime). 
34 e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE§ 13:69G-2.5(a) (2015); OHIO ADMIN. CODE§ 
3772-12-0S(B) (2015); 58 PA. CODE§ 503a.5(a) (2015). 
35 13-003 MISS. CODER§ 10.5(a) (LexisNexis 2015). 
36 See NEV. REV. STAT. 463.0189, .161 (2014). 
37 See Kevin Ferguson, Casino Self-Exclusion Programs Grow, Called a 
'Work in Progress,' LAS VEGAS SUN (Oct. 31, 2001, 10:01 AM), http://www.las 
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SEPs, are the responsibility of individual casinos, licensees, and casmo 
companies,38 though having SEPs is not a condition oflicensure.39 
As will be discussed, the details of SEPs may have a bearing on their 
effectiveness. But even when the specific features of SEPs are adjusted, the 
question remains: how effective are SEPs in addressing problem gambling? 
III. ENROLLMENT AND ADMINISTRATION: WHO OPERATES THE SEP? 
The fact a gambler seeks out a SEP is an indication that the gambler 
vegassun. com/news/2001 I oct/31 I casino-self-exclusion-programs-grow-called-a-
work-/ ("[Carol O'Hare, Executive Director of the Nevada Council on Problem 
Gambling, said] it's unrealistic to expect a program in Nevada like those in 
Missouri or New Jersey because of the size of the industry in the Silver State.") 
38 See NEV. GAMING REG. § 5.170 (2015); see also Responsible Gaming, 
CAESARS ENTM'T, http://caesarscorporate.com/about-caesars/responsible-gaming/ 
(last visited June 30, 2015); Responsible Gaming, BELLAGIO LAS VEGAS, https:// 
www.bellagio.com/casino/responsible-gaming.aspx (last visited June 30, 2015); 
Responsible Gaming, WYNN LAS VEGAS, http://www.wynnlasvegas.com/Casino/ 
ResponsibleGaming (last visited June 30, 2015). 
39 See NEV. GAMING REG. § 5.170 (2014) (requiring licensees to adopt 
"programs to address problem gambling" only under certain circumstances). 
Specifically, the Regulations require that: 
Each licensee that engages in the issuance of credit, check cashing, 
or the direct mail marketing of gaming opportunities, shall 
implement a program containing the elements described below, as 
appropriate, that allows patrons to self-limit their access to the 
issuance of credit, check cashing, or direct mail marketing by that 
licensee. As appropriate, such program shall contain, at a 
minimum, the following: 
(a) The development of written materials for dissemination to 
patrons explaining the program; 
(b) The development of written forms allowing patrons to 
participate in the program; 
( c) Standards and procedures that allow a patron to be 
prohibited from access to check cashing, the issuance of 
credit, and the participation in direct mail marketing of 
gaming opportunities; 
( d) Standards and procedures that allow a patron to be 
removed from the licensee's direct mailing and other direct 
marketing regarding gaming opportunities at that licensee's 
location; and 
( e) Procedures and forms requiring the patron to notify a 
designated office of the licensee within 10 days of the 
patron's receipt of any financial gaming privilege, material or 
promotion covered by the program. 
NEV. GAMING REG.§ 5.170(4) 
36 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:29 
recognizes the need to address his or her gambling behavior.40 While there is 
considerable variation among jurisdictions, the SEP enrollment process can 
significantly impact the effectiveness of the program.41 For example, if the 
gambler enrolls by going to a casino, it is very likely he or she will be dealing 
with casino employees who have little or no training in dealing with issues of 
problem gambling. In fact, the matter may be viewed as a "security issue,"42 
and in some respects that may be true; people who are on exclusion lists of any 
type, by definition, should not be on the premises, and keeping them off or 
ejecting them would seem to fall under the rubric of security. But this 
underscores an important limitation of many SEPs. When enrollment in, and 
enforcement of, SEPs is perceived as a matter of security, the orientation of the 
SEP is punitive and not therapeutic.43 Security personnel are not trained to 
evaluate the need for other interventions that a person enrolling in a SEP may 
require. 44 Like other casino employees, they are not social workers, nor should 
they be expected to act as such. 
One way of addressing the enrollment issue is to train the person in charge 
of a casino's SEP to inform enrolling gamblers of psychological counseling 
services available to the gambler.45 SEPs could thus serve as a gateway to other 
40 See Sally M. Gainsbury, Review of Self-Exclusion from Gambling Venues as 
an Intervention for Problem Gambling, 30 J. GAMBLING STUD. 229, 246 (2014) 
("A gambler's willingness to address their adverse gambling behaviours [sic] 
precedes self-exclusion in most cases."). 
41 See id. at 246-4 7. 
42 Id. at 232 ("Venue security personnel typically enforce self-exclusion 
policies."); From Enforcement to Assistance: Evolving Best Practices in Self-
Exclusion, RESPONSIBLE GAMBLING COUNCIL 7 (March 2008) [hereinafter 
RESPONSIBLE GAMBLING COUNCIL], available at http://www.responsiblegambling 
.org/docs/research-reports/from-enforcement-to-assistance-evolving-best-practices-
in-self-exclusion.pdf?sfvrsn=8. 
43 RESPONSIBLE GAMBLING COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 7 (noting that "the 
process of self-exclusion can be improved" by "mov[ing] self-exclusion from the 
currently predominant enforcement orientation to an individual assistance 
orientation."). See also Alex Blaszczynski et al., Self-Exclusion: A Proposed 
Gateway to Treatment Model, 7 INT'L GAMBLING STUD. 59, 67 (2007) (suggesting 
the need for SEPs to shift "from a punitive approach to an individual, client-
centered [sic] or skills-based humanistic model where the focus is on enhancing 
internal controls of the individual to assist them in regaining control over gambling 
behavior"). 
44 Blaszczynski et al., supra note 43, at 65 ("Gaming operators invested with 
the authority to complete a self-exclusion order in consultation with the gamblers 
generally do not have formal qualifications in behavioural [sic] health sciences or 
the requisite skills to undertake a competent clinical assessment of the 
psychological status, specific needs of the gambler, or the capacity to identify and 
respond to suicidal risk."). 
45 See id. at 65, 67. 
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treatment.46 In addition, the connection between the casino and the counseling 
services would allow for better monitoring of the effectiveness of the SEP.47 
However, there is a question of how eager casinos would be to hire personnel 
or otherwise invest in the resources to perform this task.48 There is another 
problem with the casino serving as the place of enrollment. If a person decides 
he or she wants to self-exclude after leaving a gaming venue, it is a bad idea to 
tell the person that he or she needs to return to the very place that is the source 
of the problem. Problem gamblers should not be in casinos. 
Another possibility is for states to administer SEPs. If casinos do not want 
to train employees to act as educators and sources of information for problem 
gamblers, the state could take on the SEP function with trained personnel 
whose salaries are paid by dedicated gaming revenues.49 Centralization of the 
SEP mechanism would provide consistency in application and would 
emphasize that problem gambling is a public health concem.50 State employees 
could deal individually with those enrolling in the SEP and integrate the SEP 
with other interventions and counseling that would be appropriate. 51 
Such a robust and comprehensive approach would require considerable 
human and financial resources, and casinos would likely resist additional taxes 
on gaming revenues to subsidize it. 52 Moreover, the state-centered 
46 See id. at 65. 
47 See id. at 64 (noting the "need for concurrent counseling interventions" to 
go along with self-exclusion programs). 
48 See id. at 62 ("[The gaming] industry has invested more resources in 
defending the credibility of self-exclusion programmes [sic] than in developing an 
effective, integrated system of self-exclusion that complements other harm 
minimization measures or in introducing appropriate systems for outcome 
monitoring"). 
49 Cf id. at 67-69 (proposing a self-exclusion model that "utilizes a qualified 
trained educator system that provides monitoring in a supportive environment . . . 
for the gambler" and "recognizes the on-going need for gaming venues to 
participate actively ... and provide vigilant, continuous support to participants"). 
50 See id. at 65 (noting the effectiveness of self-exclusion programs is limited 
by a "lack of a centralized management system"); LIA NOWER, RUTGERS UNIV. 
CTR. FOR GAMBLING STUD., SELF-EXCLUSION: LEGAL & POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
22, available at http://massgaming.com/wp-content/uploads/l 0-Self-Exclusion-
Programs-Legal-and-Policy-Considerations.pdf (discussing the need for a 
centralized system). 
51 See Blaszczynski et al., supra note 43, at 67-68. 
52 Many states dedicate a certain amount of money to assist in problem 
gambling initiatives. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 458A.070 (2014). But see 
Zhidong Hao et al., In Search of Best Practices in Responsible Gaming (RG): A 
Comparative Study of RG among Macau, Las Vegas, and Melbourne Casinos, 18 
GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 361, 367 (2014) (discussing that when states experience 
budget problems, funds for problem gambling may be an easy target for cuts). 
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administration of SEPs would not work in Nevada, where, as stated earlier, a 
statewide SEP is viewed as not feasible. 53 A problem gambler in Nevada who 
executes a SEP at one gaming property could simply walk across the street and 
gamble at another venue without violating the terms of a SEP.54 
Because of the complicated pathology of compulsive gambling,55 it is 
uncertain what role self-exclusions can play in addressing the issue.56 Some 
researchers maintain that there has been "minimal robust and comprehensive 
research" evaluating the effectiveness of SEPs. 57 If SEPs are going to be used, 
continuing research on their optimal construction and implementation is 
essential, as the form of the programs will have a significant impact on their 
effectiveness. 
Some treatment professionals praise SEPs as an important service that 
helps problem gamblers to limit further loss. 58 When gamblers use SEPs it 
"demonstrates that individuals accept to some degree that their gambling is 
excessive and causing harm, recognize a need to take personal responsibility to 
address the issue and demonstrate motivation to become active participants in 
the process."59 But they caution that SEPs do "not constitute a formal treatment 
intervention."60 Their greatest value is when they can be part of an integrated 
approach tailored to the individual needs of the gambler. 61 Ultimately, 
transforming SEPs from a punitive to a therapeutic orientation requires a 
formidable commitment of resources. It remains to be seen whether this 
commitment exists, regardless of who administers the SEP. 
53 See Ferguson, supra note 37. 
54 However, some casino companies which own numerous gaming properties 
apply the SEP to all their properties. See, e.g., CAESARS ENTM'T, supra note 38 
("Our 'self-restriction' program allows a person to request not to receive direct 
marketing by Caesars owned, managed, or operated properties, as well as be denied 
credit and check cashing privileges. Our 'self-exclusion' program allows a guest to 
request to have all privileges, including play privileges denied at all Caesars 
owned, managed, or operated properties."). 
55 See Gainsbury, supra note 40, at 230 ("Problem gambling appears to be 
caused by a complex interaction between individual factors and a range of social 
and environmental influences .... "(citing to other studies)). 
56 See id. at 230, 246-47. 
57 . Id. at 229. 
58 Gainsbury, supra note 40, at 246 ("The assessments of self-exclusion 
programs internationally generally find that the majority of participants benefit 
from such schemes."). 
59 Blaszczynski et al., supra note 43, at 60. 
60 Id. 
61 Seif-Exclusion 101, supra note 19 ("Self-exclusion alone does nothing to 
help get problem gamblers into treatment. It has to be part of a larger 
comprehensive treatment initiative." (quoting Keith Whyte, Executive Director of 
the National Council on Problem Gambling) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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IV. ENFORCEMENT OF THE SEP 
If problem gamblers who enrolled in SEPs always observed their terms and 
stayed away from gambling venues, it would be easier to assess the 
contribution of SEPs to the reduction of problem gambling. Unfortunately, this 
is not the case.62 The violation of SEPs by gamblers raises some of the most 
vexing problems of SEPs. 
The very fact a gambler enrolls in a SEP suggests an understanding of his 
or her responsibility to stay away from the casino. 63 But research shows that 
many self-excluded gamblers believe it is the responsibility of the casino to 
enforce the provisions of the SEP,64 though this is not a universally held view. 65 
The feeling that it is the casino's role to identify and exclude may be a function 
of the punitive, law-enforcement focus of the SEP. But regardless of the 
gambler's view of his or her responsibility, it does raise the question of the 
casino's role in enforcing the self-exclusion. 
SEPs can be enforced at a higher level of confidence if casinos take certain 
precautions. For example, before a gambler enters a gaming venue, he or she 
could be required to provide identification to security persom1el. The gambler's 
name could then be checked against the list of those who have self-excluded for 
that property, or if statewide exclusions are used, against that list. Establishing 
and maintaining such a database would not seem to be an especially costly 
matter. 66 Many casinos in Europe require gamblers to show identification 
before entering the gaming venue. 67 Such action would also allow for the 
62 See RESPONSIBLE GAMBLING COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 10 (discussing a 
focus group survey of self-excluders of which "30% gambled at the banned venue 
and 59% engaged in other forms of gambling during their bans"); see also Nelson, 
et al., supra note 15, at 130 (discussing a study of self-excluded individuals that 
concluded "36% returned to the casino and 50% continued to gamble at other 
venues during their exclusion period"). 
63 See Blaszcynski et al., supra note 43 at 64; Gainsbury, supra note 40, at 
246. 
64 See Blaszcynski et al., supra note 43 at 64. 
65 Id.; Carol O'Hare, Self-Exclusion--Concept vs. Reality, 8 GAMING L. REV. 
189, 190 (2004) ("The self-exclusion agreement was intended to be a positive, 
healthy roadblock in the face of the unhealthy temptations of the addiction. For this 
reason, the program was designed to place the bulk of responsibility and burden of 
compliance upon the individual who asked to be excluded, not on the institutions 
who implemented and monitored the process."). 
66 Indeed, some states already require the creation and maintenance of such 
databases. E.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 61D-14.020(2) (2015); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 
11, § 1770.240(b) (2014) (requiring a self-exclusion database for state lottery); 205 
MASS. CODE REGS.§ 133.05(1) (2015). 
67 Gainsbury, supra note 40, at 244. 
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screening of prospective underage gamblers.68 Clearly, 
enforcement measures would place a burden on casinos. 69 
[Vol. 6:29 
such 
In casinos with a single means of access, identification checks would be 
tenable, though certainly cumbersome. But for casinos with many 
this would present a logistical nightmare, at least from the casino's perspective. 
Moreover, it would suggest a fortress mentality that is not consistent with the 
carefree image a gaming property would want to project. In most instances, the 
practical barriers to identification checks, as a way to screen for self-exduded 
gamblers before they enter a casino, have limited utility. 
A fundamental requirement of regulated gaming is that casinos 
underage persons from gambling. 70 Security persormel can check the 
identification of a person in a gaming area who appears to be 
Identifying a gambler who is on a self-exclusion list, however, is a much more 
difficult undertaking. Dealers who conduct table games are trained to check 
identification of a person who may be underage. This could be to 
check the identification of anyone playing a table game. the extra 
step of mnning the identification through the self-exclusion database will slow 
play at the table. Slot or video poker machines could also be set so that a 
"player's card" would have to be inserted during the time of 71 The 
player's card could be cross-referenced to the self-exclusion list If the 
68 For discussion and identification of the required 
state, see Legal Gambling Age in the United States, LEGALGAMBLIN
http://www.legalgamblingusa.com/legal--gambling-agc.html (last visited June 30, 
2015) (noting there are 37 states which require an individual to be 21 
to participate in various forms of gambling, while J. 3 states require an age of 1 
69 Casinos are notorious for not checking patron identification until it is in the 
best interest of the casino to do so. See, e.g., Problem Gamblers Pose 
Casinos.· A Roundtable Discussion, 14 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 
[hereinafter Roundtable Discussion]; Eric Zorn, Casino to Gambler: HeadsWe 
Win, Tails You Lose, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 17, 2007), http://blogs.chicagotribune.com 
/news_ columnists_ ezorn/2007 /08/casino-to-gambLhtml. 
70 See Underage Gambling, AM. GAMING Ass'N, http://www.americangaming 
.org/industry-resources/research/fact-sheets/underage-gambling visited June 
30, 2015) ("Preventing underage gambling always has been a high priority for 
commercial casino companies."); see also Code of Conduct, AM. GAMING 
http://www.americangaming.org/social-responsibility/responsible-gaming/code-
conduct (last visited June 30, 2015). 
71 For an interesting perspective on the role of players' cards in see 
George Dvorsky, The Reason Casinos Track Your Behavior? To Lure You Into 
Gambling too Much, 109.COM (June 12, 2012), http://io9.com/5917868/the-reason-
casinos-track-your-behavior-to-lure-you-into-gambling-too-much. 
for SEP purposes, could be designed so that the information on the card was for 
identification purposes only, and not for marketing purposes or for tracking the 
amount the player was gambling. 
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gambler's name was on the self-exclusion list, the machine would not operate 
and security could be notified. In fact, a casino could require presentation of 
identification for any form of gambling, whether in the form of table games, 
machines, or sports books. 
The precautions noted above, while certainly not failsafe, would give teeth 
to SEPs. Moreover, since a self-excluded gambler would know he could not 
gamble anonymously, his motivation to violate the self-exclusion might be 
diminished. 72 Such a cumbersome process of identification verification, which 
results in slower play and therefore less wagering, is not one that the casino 
industry would be expected to support. This underscores a core limitation of 
SEPs.73 Without the industry committing significant resources to enforce the 
SEPs, the burden falls on the gambler, the person who is already struggling 
with gambling impulse control. It is fine to say that personal responsibility 
must be placed on the individual,74 but promoting SEPs as an industry 
commitment to addressing problem gambling is, without robust enforcement 
partnership, disingenuous. At the same time, there is an intuitive sense that a 
practical limit exists for what casinos can be expected to do to detect excluded 
persons. Equipping employees with photos of excluded persons and having 
them scour the premises and the faces of the many people coming and going in 
a casino seems unrealistic, as does the use of facial recognition software.75 
The fact is, however, that casinos do find self-excluded gamblers on their 
premises.76 This can occur when a self-excluded person applies for a player's 
card, cashes a check, or seeks credit. Identity verification in those settings is 
routine and the self-excluded gambler would be detected. A self-excluded 
person would likely be aware that these actions would reveal his or her 
forbidden presence and avoid them. So if the self-excluded gambler does 
eschew these contacts with casino personnel, how would he or she be caught? 
72 See Roundtable Discussion, supra note 69, at 110 (quoting attorney Paul 
West and noting that the reason why a self-excluded gambler would continue to 
gamble and risk detection may be that the problem gambler views this as a 
gratifying part of the "desire for risk"). 
73 See id. at 105 (noting that some heightened security undertakings by casinos 
in relation to "[s]elf-exclusion[s] almost seem to work against the casino's interest" 
(quoting Emir Aly Crowne Mohammed, Assistant Professor of Law, University of 
Windsor, Ontario, Canada)). 
74 Cf supra notes 40, 43 and accompanying text. 
75 While facial recognition software may have some effectiveness in 
identifying self-excluded gamblers, it is not clear that the technology is a best 
practice that should be adopted by casinos. See RESPONSIBLE GAMBLING COUNCIL, 
supra note 42, at 10 n.3 (making the point that while "[f]acial recognition has the 
potential to be a valuable tool" in the effort to detect self-excluded gamblers, 
verification of identity still requires human judgments and observations). 
76 See, e.g., Swanson v. Horseshoe Hammond, LLC, 445 F. App'x 868, 869 
(7th Cir. 2011). 
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The trigger for discovery, ironically, may be that the gambler wins a 
prize-often on a machine-that is substantial enough to require identification 
before the gambler is paid.77 Federal law requires that a Form W-2G be 
completed when a gambler wins $1,200 or more on a slot machine. 78 Other 
types of gambling winnings have different thresholds.79 A self-excluded 
gambler who defies the commitment to stay away, gambles undetected, and 
adds to his or her miseries by losing, has no form to fill out. But the gambler 
who hits a slot jackpot of $1,200, and seeks to collect it, can be arrested for 
trespass.80 The irony is compounded by the fact that self-exclusion agreements 
almost universally provide that the gambler agrees to forfeit winnings from 
gambling in violation of the agreement.81 Thus, losses of a discovered violator 
are not returned, but winnings are confiscated. 
If a goal of a SEP is to provide disincentives to a gambler to dishonor his 
or her enrollment, the forfeiture of winnings accomplishes that, and properly so 
in the minds of many treatment professionals. 82 But this result may also explain 
why casinos might not be fastidious in maintaining access controls to their 
property. According to one treatment professional: 
There are many recovering gamblers I have talked to in jurisdictions 
without adequate access controls that have a very incredibly cynical 
[perception]: "I can get back on the property, I can gamble, and they 
will let me gamble as long as I am losing. It is only upon winning that 
77 See Roundtable Discussion, supra note 69, at 105. 
78 See IRS, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORMS W-2G & 5754, at 4 (2015) available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/iw2g. pdf. 
79 See generally id. at 2-5 (identifying the specific reporting thresholds for 
wagers in relation to horse and dog racing, jai alai, sweepstakes, wagering pools, 
lotteries, bingo, keno, and poker tournaments). 
80 See e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 432.225(13) (1997); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 
l 12-l 12-5(d)(l) (2015); 16-633-13 ME. CODE R. § 2(2)(A)(3)(e) (2015). 
81 See infra Appendix; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4834(a) (2014) ("A 
person may request placement on the list of self-excluded persons . . . by agreeing 
that, during the period of voluntary exclusion, the person may not collect any 
winnings or recover any losses resulting from any gaming activity .... "); KAN. 
ADMIN. REGS. 112-112-6 (2015) ("Each person who has been placed on the self-
exclusion list shall surrender to the commission all prizes, jackpots, chips or tokens 
in play, pay vouchers, coupons, and electronic credits . . . obtained after the 
person's placement on the self-exclusion list."); Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 11, § 
45-l 7.020(1)(A) (2014) ("[T]he applicant agrees that once placed on the List ifs/he 
is discovered on an excursion gambling boat, jackpots or winnings in his/her 
possession at the time of discovery will be forfeited."). 
82 RESPONSIBLE GAMBLING COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 11 ("There was a 
reasonable consensus among ... experts that jackpot winnings should not be given 
to a person who is in breach of their ban."). 
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they seize my money and throw me back out."83 
With this in mind, what incentives are there for a casino to be vigilant in 
enforcing self-exclusions? Forfeiture of winnings may create disincentives for 
the casino, especially if the casino retains the funds that are forfeited by the 
gambler. There are very few references in SEP statutes to what becomes of the 
forfeited winnings. 84 It seems appropriate to direct such funds to the state or to 
trust funds that are used for gambling treatment or prevention. 85 
There are other undercmTents of skepticism regarding the industry's 
commitment to enforcing SEPs. It is commonly stated that casinos want people 
to gamble "for the right reasons-to simply have fun." 86 Fmther, the sentiment 
that, "problem gambling is bad for the casino business," finds frequent 
expression by industry responsible gaming sources. 87 But there is research that 
concludes that problem gamblers make up a large percentage of casino revenue. 
"Several jurisdiction-wide prevalence surveys have investigated the proportion 
of revenues derived from problem gamblers" and "have found problem 
gamblers to account for a disproportionate share of gaming revenue."88 These 
83 Roundtable Discussion, supra note 69, at 105 (quoting Keith Whyte, 
Executive Director of the National Council on Problem Gambling in Washington, 
D.C.). 
84 But see IOWA CODE ANN. § 99F.4(22) (2014) ("[A]ny money or thing of 
value that has been obtained by, or is owed to, a voluntary excluded person by a 
licensee as a result of wagers made by the person after the person has been 
voluntarily excluded shall not be paid to the person but shall be credited to the 
general fund of the state."). 
85 E.g., KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 112-112-6 (2014) ("The items surrendered to the 
commission shall be liquidated or redeemed and shall be transferred to the state's 
problem gambling and addictions fund."); see RESPONSIBLE GAMBLING COUNCIL, 
supra note 42, at 11 ("[W]innings [sh]ould be kept in trust funds and used for 
problem gambling treatment or prevention."). 
86 CAESARS ENTM'T, supra note 38. 
87 David Klepper, New York Needs Help with Gambling Addiction, LAS 
VEGAS REV.-J. (Oct. 4, 2014, 7:50 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/business/ 
casinos-gaming/new-york-needs-help-gambling-addiction (quoting Jan Jones 
Blackhurst, Caesars spokeswoman). Accord Rich Ryan, Inside Gaming: Further 
Studies Regarding Problem Gambling, Boston Bickering, and More, 
POKERNEWS.COM (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.pokemews.com/news/2013/08/ 
inside-gaming-further-studies-regarding-prob lem-gamb ling-bos-1607 0 .htm 
("There's a very strong negative business agenda attached to problem gamblers ... 
. It's bad for our reputation and bad for business." (quoting Itai Frieberger, Chief 
Operating Officer of888 Holdings)). 
88 ROBERT WILLIAMS & ROBERT WOOD, THE DEMOGRAPHIC SOURCES OF 
ONTARIO GAMING REVENUE, ONTARIO PROBLEM GAMBLING RESEARCH CTR. 9 
(2004 ), available at http://stoppredatorygambling.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/ 
The-Demographic-Sources-of-Ontario-Gaming-Revenue. pdf. 
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studies found the proportion of revenue that came from problem gamblers was 
33% in Australia, 15% in the United States, 23% in Canadian provinces, and 
19% in New Zealand.89 
It is not surprising that small numbers of gamblers produce a large portion 
ofa casino's revenues. "The Pareto Principle, or '80/20 rule'" maintains that 80 
percent of revenue comes from 20 percent of a business's customers.90 One 
casino consultant has written that the 80/20 figure is not accurate for casinos; 
rather, 90 percent of gaming revenues are produced by 10 percent of casino 
customers.91 In a study of 18,000 gamblers who held loyalty cards at Native 
American casinos, "two professors found that 9.3% of the gamblers ... 
produced 80% of the ... revenue."92 Similarly, a study "of 4,222 Internet 
gamblers who wagered ... on casino-style games of chance" found that, of 
those "customers, just 2.8%-or 119 big losers-provided half of the casino's 
take, and 10.7% provided 80% of the take."93 
Being a frequent casino customer, or a gambler who wagers large amounts 
of money, does not make a person a problem gambler. But if a casino knows 
that a gambler in breach of a self-exclusion is limited in his or her winnings, is 
not limited in his or her losses, and that these people produce a considerable 
portion of casino revenue, it strains credulity to think the casinos would regard 
it in their interest to invest considerable resources in preventing self-excluded 
gamblers from wagering. Where enforcing self-exclusion directly affects casino 
revenues, the conflict of interest is fundamental and systemic.94 
89 Id. at 10, table 1. 
90 Dave Lavinsky, Pareto Principle: How to Use it to Dramatically Grow 
Your Business, FORBES (Jan. 20, 2014, 9:39 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
davelavinsky/2014/01/20/pareto-principle-how-to-use-it-to-dramatically-grow-your 
-business/. 
91 Andrew Klebanow, Marketing: How to Increase Gaming Revenue in an 
Economic Downturn, INDIAN GAMING, Oct. 2011, at 70, available at http://www. 
indiangaming.com/istore/Octl 1 Klebanow.pdf. 
92 Mark Maremont & Alexandra Berzon, How Often do Gamblers Really 
Win?, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2013, 1:56 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001 
424052702304626104579123383535635644 (discussing a database analysis 
conducted by Puneet Manchanda of the University of Michigan and Hee Mok Park 
of the University of Connecticut). 
93 Id. 
94 See Blaszczynski et al., supra note 43, at 65-66 ("Tension exists among 
gaming industry operators between promoting a legitimate commercial product for 
profit and implementing responsible gaming initiatives whose purpose is 
specifically designed to reduce gaming and, ipso facto, gaming revenue."). 
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v. How CAN CASINOS BE HELD LEAST PARTIALLY) ACCOUNTABLE 
FOR ENFORCING SEPS? 
If there is concern that casinos are motivated to be active 
partners in the enforcement of self-exclusions, are there appropriate measures 
that can spur greater commitment? One is to connect casino 
enforcement efforts to licensing and regulatory standards. Casinos that are not 
vigilant in excluding underage gamblers are subject to regulatory sanction.95 As 
noted above, however, applying the same to detect a self-excluded 
gambler is impractical.96 If a casino knowingly disregarded the presence of a 
self-excluded gambler on its premises, it is likely that regulators would impose 
a sanction, assuming were aware of it.97 Such flagrant, bad faith actions 
would probably be rare, or infrequently detected.98 Though it can be difficult to 
determine whether regulatory sanctions in any state have been assessed for 
such a violation, there is no reported case of such a sanction imposed and 
challenged by the casino. Ultimately, it appears that regulatory sanctions have 
not been a mechanism of accountability for failure to enforce SEPs, 
Another means of creating incentives for casinos to be in 
95 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN.§ 725,19(2) (2015); see also supra note 70 and 
accompanying text. 
96 See discussion supra Part IV. 
97 States rarely publish of regulatory sanctions in a format 
accessible by the public. But see, e.g., Press Casino Violations Result in 
$105,000 in Fines Levied by the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board (May. 15, 
2013), http://gamingcontrolboard.pa.gov/?pr=5 Press Release, $128,000 in Fines 
Levied Against Two Casinos by the Pennsylvania Control Board for 
Violations (May. 23, 2012) http://gamingcontrolboard.pa.gov/?pr=466; Press 
Release, Self-Exclusion List Violations Lead to $40,000 Fine for PA Casino 
2010) available at http://gamingcontrolboard.pa.gov/?pr=372; Press Release 
Self-Exclusion Violation Leads to $10,000 Fine for PA Casino 2010) 
available at http://gamingcontrolboard.pa.gov/?pr=340; Press Release, Self-
Exclusion Violation Leads to $20,000 Fine for PA Casino 7, 2010) available 
at http://gamingcontrolboard.pa.gov/?pr=336. Although state publications are rare, 
casino SEP violations are still likely to be reported on by other sources. E.g., Brian 
Pempus, Iowa Casino Allows Self-Banned Gambler to Play, CARD PLAYER 
22, 2014), http://www.cardplayer.com/poker-news/17 l 33-iowa-casino-fined-for-
allowing-self-banned-gambler-to-play (discussing sanctions imposed on an Iowa 
casino for allowing a self-excluded individual to gamble and even obtain a 
card); Rivers Casino Fined for Soliciting Gamblers an Self-Exclusion List, 
ABCl I.COM (Mar. 23, 2012, 2:29 PM), http://abcll.com/archive/8593325/ 
(discussing sanctions imposed by the Illinois Gaming Board in response to a casino 
sending a self-excluded individual promotional materials). 
98 Some have suggested the need for "an objective and system of 
monitoring and auditing industry utilization and compliance with self-exclusion 
programmes [sic]." Blaszczynski et supra note 43, at 66. 
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self-exclusions is through civil court actions. For many years, gamblers have 
filed lawsuits, or asserted counterclaims, against casinos seeking to recover 
their losses.99 Some of these cases allege that a casino facilitated the gambler's 
addiction even when that casino was aware of the compulsive nature of the 
gambler's activity. 100 In some instances, the effort to recover losses was based 
on the claim the casino had knowingly permitted a visibly intoxicated gambler 
to wager-and lose-large amounts of money. 101 Theories of recovery range 
from negligence, intentional infliction of mental distress, contract claims, and a 
host of statutory and regulatory bases.102 Where serving of alcohol is involved, 
dram shop theories are asserted. 103 
Courts have not been sympathetic to these claims. In order for such a 
negligence claim to be successful, the casino must have a duty to control the 
gambler's behavior must exist, and courts have declined to impose such a duty. 
Intentional tort theories have failed due to a lack of proof that the casino acted 
in an "extreme and outrageous" manner. 104 Contract theories have floundered 
due to a lack of proof that there was an agreement between the gambler and 
casino that the casino would act in good faith to protect the gambler from 
excessive losses. 105 The federal statutory and regulatory claims failed due to a 
lack of any demonstration of "predicate criminal acts" by the casino. 106 
In the time since SEPs have become widespread, gamblers have sued 
casinos for failing to exclude them when they were on a self-exclusion list. In 
Merrill v. Trump Indiana, Inc., a compulsive gambler alleged that he wrote a 
casino and asked that he be excluded from its property. 107 Though the casino 
placed him on its "eviction list," the gambler claimed he was allowed to return 
to gamble at the casino, where he subsequently lost so much money he ended 
99 See, e.g., Taveras v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., No. 07-4555, 2008 WL 
4372791 at *2-3 (D.N.J. Sept. 19, 2008); Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 
876 F. Supp. 625, 627-28 (D.N.J. 1994); Tose v. Great Bay Hotel & Casino Inc., 
819 F. Supp. 1312, 1314 (D.N.J. 1993). See also Matt Pearce, Gambler Who Lost 
$500,000 Sues, Saying Casino Let Him Play Drunk, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2014), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2014/mar/06/nation/la-na-nn-drunk-vegas-gambler-2014 
0306. For a detailed analysis of this type oflitigation, see generally Justin E. Bauer, 
Comment, Self-Exclusion & the Compulsive Gambler: The House Shouldn't 
Always Win, 27 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 63 (2006); Irina Slavina, Note, Don't Bet on It: 
Casinos' Contractual Duty to Stop Compulsive Gamblers from Gambling, 85 Cm-
KENT L. REV. 369 (2010). 
100 See, e.g., Taveras, 2008 WL 4372791 at *1. 
101 See, e.g., Tose, 819 F. Supp. at 1314. 
102 See generally cases cited supra note 99. 
103 See, e.g., Tose, 819 F. Supp. at 1315-18. 
104 E.g., Taveras, 2008 WL 4372791 at *5-6. 
105 See id. at *6. 
106 See id. at *7. 
107 Merrill v. Trump Indiana, Inc., 320 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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up robbing banks and going to prison.108 At the time the gambler relapsed, 
casinos were not required to maintain an eviction list. 109 But that may not have 
made any difference. As the court put it: 
Even if the amended regulation applied, however, it is by no means 
certain that the regulation would sustain a cause of action against 
Trump. Trump is required by regulation to maintain an exclusion log 
and to add to that list individuals who request to be put on it. But 
Trump's obligation to follow regulations promulgated by the Indiana 
Gaming Commission does not automatically translate into a duty of 
care owed to compulsive gamblers. At most, the rules impose upon 
Trump a duty to the state through the gaming commission, not to a 
self-requesting evictee. 
If Trump violates regulations, it must answer to the gaming 
commission-the current rules provide for administrative and 
disciplinary hearings, as well as sanctions against casinos, including 
fines and rescindment of licenses. 110 
The court held that if the legislature had wanted to create a private right of 
action, in favor of a gambler against a casino that did not follow regulations 
regarding self'.-exclusions, it would have said so explicitly. m The statutory and 
regulatory regime for gambling in the state was so voluminous, including 
administrative sanctions enforced by the gaming commission, that the absence 
of any reference to a private right of action was telling. 112 Finally, the court 
declined to find any common law duty on the casino's part to honor eviction 
. . 113 prov1s10ns. 
Courts are in accord that when casinos don't enforce regulatory provisions 
relating to SEPs, they may face administrative sanctions, but they are not 
subject to civil liability to the gambler. 114 The obligation, such as it is, that 
casinos have to enforce SEPs is one owed to regulators, who may or may not 
sanction the offending licensee for violations. The absence of liability may also 
be a matter of enforcing provisions in the self-exclusion agreement itself 
whereby the gambler releases the casino from any liability.115 Or, as in New 
108 See id. at 730-31. 




113 Id. at 732-33. 
114 See, e.g., Nelson v. MGM Grand Hotel, LLC, 287 F. App'x 587, 589 (9th 
Cir. 2008); Fleeger v. Bell, 23 F. App'x. 741, 743 (9th Cir. 2001). 
115 See, e.g., IOWA GAMING Ass'N, supra note 10, at 2 ("I will not seek to hold 
the Casinos liable in any way should I continue gambling at any casino after the 
date of this exclusion request. Specifically, I . . . hereby release and forever 
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by statute: 
c. A licensed casino or facility or employee thereof shall 
not be liable to any self·excluded person or to any other party in any 
proceeding for any monetary or otherwise, which may 
arise as a result of: 
( 1) the failure of a licensed casino or simulcasting facility to 
withhold gaming privileges from, or restore gaming privileges 
a self-excluded person; or 
(2) otherwise permitting a self-excluded person to engage in 
gaming activity in such licensed casino or simulcasting facility 
while on the list of self-·excluded persons. 
One might wonder whether it is good public policy to immunize casinos 
from civil liability when they act in contravention of a SEP. Is administrative 
sanction without fear of damage awards by the civil justice system sufficient 
incentive for the casino to be scrupulous in its enforcement of a SEP? It may be 
that this has the simple answer of "no." Nevertheless, imposing civil 
liability to create such incentives would lead to substantial moral hazard risks. 
A gambler who believes he or she is protected against the risk of excessive 
losses casino responsibility for failure to enforce the gambler's self-
exclusion has no reason to adjust the behavior that led him or her to execute the 
self-exclusion in the first place. Allowing civil recovery reinforces the concern 
that gamblers could view it as primarily the casino's responsibility to enforce 
the self-exclusion, rather than the gambler's duty to observe it for him/herself. 
This undcm1ines the SEP's objective of acting as an acknowledgement by the 
gambler of his or her problem, and taking steps to control it. 
The upshot is this: casinos lack incentives that would encourage them to 
meaningful resources into helping to enforce SEPs. The potential winnings 
of the self-excluded gambler are constrained by the practicalities of claiming 
winnings; losses are not. Administrative sanctions for lack of enforcement 
efforts are likely insubstantial. Comt actions gamblers against casinos for 
failing to enforce SEPs have been met with little success, and, as a matter of 
furthering the of SEPs, this is probably the appropriate result. These 
are important limitations to bear in mind when assessing the utility of SEPs in 
addressing problem gambling. 
discharge the Casinos, their parent companies, all of their direct and indirect 
subsidiaries, their partners, agents, employees, officers, affiliates, directors, 
successors, and assigns, and those with whom the Casinos may lawfully share 
information regarding this exclusion, including the Iowa Racing and Gaming 
Commission ... from any and all claims in law or equity .... "). 
116 NJ. STAT.§ 5:12-71.2 (2014). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 27:27.l(D) 
(2014). 
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VI. ARE SEPS A DISTRACTION? 
Although the first SEP was in response to a citizen's request, 
forces have historically driven SEPs. 117 In the struggle to understand and 
address the complicated set of factors that lead to a person not being able to 
gamble responsibly, SEPs "have become the predominant harm-reduction 
strategy used by the gaming industly."118 But there are numerous other 
strategies that can be employed to deal with problem gambling. In a 
few of these, it is appropriate to ask: does the emphasis on SEPs distract from 
consideration of these alternatives? Is the support of SEPs by the gaming 
industry, especially given the limitations noted above, a way of reinforc ing 
distraction? 
An exhaustive analysis of all the proposals and means to address problem 
gambling is beyond the scope of this discussion. Indeed, the literature on this 
has been substantial. !19 But even a brief survey illustrates the opportunities for 
study and implementation. These measures are notable because they change the 
focus from being exclusively on the gambler, and direct attention to the way in 
which the games are offered. 
Problem gambling can, and does, exist across the panoply of gambling 
opportunities. 120 Research has shown, however, that machine gambling has a 
greater addictive capacity than other forms of gambling. 121 Some researchers 
suggest that this is a function of "the solitary, continuous, rapid wagering [the 
machines] enable."122 Games , like craps and blackjack involve human 
interaction and social feedback. Machine play is different, as Natasha Dow 
Schull's book-Addiction by Design: Machine Gambling in Las Vegas-
describes: "[t]he solitary, uninterrupted process of machine play, by contrast, 
111 See Gainsbury, supra note 40, at 231; Self-Exclusion 101, supra note 19 
(explaining how the first SEP came about). 
118 Gainsbury, supra note 40, at 231. 
119 See, e.g., id.; Bauer, supra note 99; Hon. Janette A. Bertness, Problem 
Gambling: Legal & Medical Issues, 58 R.I.B.J. 13 (Sept/Oct. 2009), available at 
https://www.ribar.com/UserFiles/Sept-Oct%2009%20Journal.pdf; Blaszczynski et 
al., supra note 43; Hao et al., supra note 52; Roundtable Discussion, supra note 69. 
120 Judy Herriff, Gambling: The Hidden Addiction, 88 MICH. B.J. 54, 56 (May 
2009) ("Incidences of problem and pathological gambling have risen as gambling 
becomes more accessible .... People gamble at casinos, participate in the ... 
lottery, play bingo or card games at charitable gaming events, bet at a home 
or participate in illegal forms of gambling such as Internet or remote gambling, 
sports betting, office pools, or animal fights."). 
121 See Robert B. Breen & Mark Zimmerman, Rapid Onset of Pathological 
Gambling in Machine Gamblers, 18 J. GAMBLING STUD, 31, 32 (Spring 2002), 
122 Natasha Dow Schull, Slot Machines are Designed to Addict, N.Y, TIMES 
(Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013il 0/09/are-casinos-
too-much-of-a-gamble/slot-machines-are-designed-to-addict. 
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tends to produce a steady, trancelike state that 'distracts from internal and 
l . ' h . d . d b d "123 ull' .b k extema issues sue as anxiety, epress1on, an ore om. Sch 's oo 
examines the way manufacturers design machines to promote play that 
inhibits reflection. 124 An important development was the replacement of gear 
driven pull handles with electronic push buttons. 125 This allowed for expedited 
play that increased the number of plays per minute and hour. 126 Similarly, bill 
validators, which allow for the insertion of larger denominations of currency 
into the machine, compress the spending gestures needed to fund continuous 
127 Feeding coins into the machine for each play is no longer necessary; 
instead, the machine displays the amount of money the player put in the 
machine that could be drawn upon for betting. 128 Also, the money inserted 
could be converted to "credits," de-materializing the money being lost (or 
won). 129 These developments are all part of the computerization of slot 
machines. This conversion of slot machines from mechanical devices to 
computerized machines enabled casinos to exercise precise controls over odds 
and payback percentage. 130 
Schull writes of problem gamblers who talk about being in a "zone" when 
they are gambling on machines. 131 They gamble not necessarily as a means to 
win money, but as an end in itself. 132 According to Schull's research, 
everything---from the layout of the machines on the casino to the design 
of the chairs the gambler sits in-is meant to promote the "zone" experience. 133 
Machine gamblers who are in the zone don't want to be interrupted and view 
the solitary nature of the activity as comforting. 134 Machines and their 
123 NATASHA Dow SCHULL, ADDICTION BY DESIGN: MACHINE GAMBLING IN 
LAS VEGAS 18-19 (2012) (quoting Anna C. Thomas et al., A Theoretical Model of 
EGM Problem Gambling: More than a Cognitive Escape, 8 INT'L J. OF MENTAL 
HEALTH & ADDICTION 7 (2009)). 
124 Id. at 52, 68. 
125 Id. at 54. 
126 See id. at 54-55. 
127 Id. at 56. 
12s Id. 
129 Id. 
130 See generally id. at 81-82. 
131 Id. at 19. 
132 Id. at 12 (noting the machine gambler's "aim is not to win but simply to 
continue"). 
133 Chapter 1 of Schull's book examines the role of casino floor plans in 
promoting the feeling that the machine gambler is entering a "secluded, private 
playing world." Id. at 41 (quoting Bill Friedman, Designing Casinos to Dominate 
the Competition, INST. FOR THE STUDY OF GAMBLING & COMMERCIAL GAMING, at 
12 (2000)). Casinos also pay careful attention to the ergonomics of a machine 
player's chair so he or she is comfortable sitting for extended periods. Id. at 67. 
134 Id. at 41 (noting gamblers "want to be isolated in their own private, 
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environment are designed to promote the gambler's "time-on-device" so that 
the odds in the house's favor are allowed to take their inevitable toll. 135 
With this in mind, one step that could be taken would be to require 
machines to operate at a slower pace. If the speed of the game helps to promote 
the "zone," regulatory standards could address this. It is not a given, however, 
that this would alter the machine gambler's behavior. It may be that slowing 
down play causes the gambler to play longer.136 Similarly, some have proposed 
that signs need to be placed on machines that give clear information about the 
odds of winning. 137 But to an addicted gambler who is playing to play, and not 
necessarily to win, this information may be superfluous. That is, the odds are 
beside the point. 138 
What about time limits on a machine counting down the time the player 
has left to play before a mandatory break in play is imposed? Duration controls 
would interrupt play, and require the gambler to at least take a breath before 
resuming gambling. But could it also have the effect of making the panicked 
gambler bet more as time runs out?139 Scrolling messages that tell the player 
how long he or she has been gambling may disrupt the "zone" and allow for 
reflection. Showing how much a gambler has won or lost in dollars, rather than 
credits, would be a reminder that real money is at stake. So would messages or 
signs instructing a gambler to "set yourself a limit and don't exceed it."140 How 
these examples would affect gambling behavior is still an open question. 
Other ideas for trying to limit problem gamblers' momentum include 
intimiate world" (quoting Friedman, supra note 134, at 66) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
135 For a general discussion of "time-on-device," see id. at 58-68. 
136 See id. at 273 (noting that "limits on the number of credits bet per tum 
might prolong play rather than decrease expenditure, while slowing reel speed 
might cause more aggressive play [while] random timeouts might provoke 
gamblers to jump to new machines" and that "problem gamblers would find ways 
to circumvent any limits programmed into machines and persist at their excessive 
behavior"). 
137 See id. at 268 (discussing how the odds of hitting a particular combination 
could be better explained to machine gamblers). 
138 "If it is true that problem gamblers suffer from substantial and irrational 
cognitive distortions during their gambling activities, it follows that this is not the 
most opportune time to intervene upon them by introducing rational mechanisms." 
Id. at 376 n.52 (quoting Bo Bernhard & F.W. Preston, On the Shoulders of Merton: 
Potentially Sobering Consequences of Problem Gambling Policy, 47 AM. BEHAV. 
SCIENTIST 1395, 1402-03 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)). These 
messages may be "much like trying to talk sense into alcoholics who are passed 
out." Id. at 271. 
139 See id. at 273 (discussing a machine gambler who said he would "probably 
double [his] bet" ifhe saw he "was running out of time"). 
140 See Hao et al., supra note 52, at 362. 
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machine signage about responsible gambling, 141 not allowing the provision of 
free alcohol, 142 requiring player cards to be inserted so casinos could track the 
losses of gamblers, 143 and forbidding the use of "false wins."144 False wins are 
produced when slot machine gamblers play multi-line games, where there are, 
for example, twenty different pay lines. 145 If a player has a win on nine of the 
twenty lines, he or she loses money. Yet, the machine reacts by telling the 
player, "you're a winner!"146 Research has shown that the "false win" can 
reinforce the addictive behavior by giving players a "false psychological 
boost. "147 
A similar tactic is the "near miss," where, a jackpot symbol appears 
directly above or below the pay line. 148 It appears to the player that he or she 
was only one "click" away from winning. 149 In fact, "the symbols displayed 
above or below the pay line have nothing to do with how close the player was 
to winning the jackpot."150Computerized slot machines make it possible to 
program near misses into the game. 151 Research has suggested that the near 
miss motivates gamblers to press on because they are so "close" to winning.152 
141 Blaszczynski et al., supra note 43, at 68. 
142 See Gainsbury, supra note 40, at 230 (noting that "electronic gaming 
machine players . . . often experience a loss of control and are more likely to 
exceed spending limits when they consume alcohol"). 
143 See Hao et al., supra note 52, at 364. 
144 See Randall Stross, I'm Losing Money. So Why Do I Feel So Good?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/0l/13/business/how-slot-
machines-raise-our-hopes-even-when-were-losing.html?_r=O. 
145 Id.; see generally Kevin A. Harrigan, Slot Machines: Pursuing Responsible 
Gaming Practices for Virtual Reels and Near Misses, 7 INT'L J. OF MENTAL 
HEALTH ADDICTION 68 (2009). 
146 For an illustration of false wins presented by the Problem Gambling 
Institute of Ontario (Canada), see Gambling Research, Slots Tutorial: An 
Introduction to Losses Disguised as Wins, YouTuBE (Feb. 25, 2011), https:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ms-BovQOlSw. 
147 Mary Dooe & Genevieve Gilson, Even When You 're Losing, Slot Machines 
Boost Your Morale-and Casinos Profit, PRI.ORG (Aug. 22, 2014, 1:45 PM), http:// 
www.pri.org/stories/2014-08-22/even-when-youre-losing-slot-machines-boost-your 
-morale-and-casino-profits (quoting Natasha Dow Schull). 
148 About Slot Machines, PROBLEM GAMBLING INST. ONTARIO, http://www. 
problemgambling.ca/gambling-help/gambling-information/about-slot-machines. 
aspx#near_misses (last visited June 30, 2015); see also Roff Smith, Near Wins 
Stoke Gamblers' Brains, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (March 1, 2014), http://news.national 
geographic.com/news/2014/02/140228-gambling-brain-win-slot-machines/. 
149 About Slot Machines, supra note 148. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id.; see generally Mike J. Dixon et al., The Frustrating Effects of Just 
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Some jurisdictions, like Nevada, prohibit the use of near misses. 153 
The measures described above focus on trying to "fix" the machine so that 
features that may promote and reinforce addictive gambling behavior are 
proscribed or limited. But some have proposed that machines could be designed 
to responsible gambling behavior. 154 In part, the machine would 
provide detailed information to the gambler about how much money he or she 
has put in to and taken out of the machine and the duration of play. 155 More 
importantly, the machine would allow gamblers to limit the amount bet on the 
machine, both per game and per session, and to set time and money limits on 
h . l 156 t e1r pay. 
In 2004, a Canadian machine manufacturer, Techlink Entertainment, 
developed what they called a "Responsible Gaming Device" (RGD), which 
incorporated these features. 157 It may be that such machines would find support 
from both industty and gamblers' advocates. 
The RGD amounts to a kind of compromise between consumer 
advocates' call for product transparency, and the industry's call for 
personal responsibility-a compromise, that is, between those who 
believe in an unfettered free market and those that believe that 
consumers need some form of "fettering." The compromise takes the 
form of a machine equipped to help gamblers "self-fetter."158 
Technological developments like the RGD illustrate that technology does 
not have to be dialed back to address problem gambling. Few would believe 
that reverting to pull handles and coin insertion is advisable or would 
significantly diminish problem gambling. However, thoughtful research and 
Missing the Jackpot: Slot Machine Near-Misses Trigger Large Skin Conductance 
Responses, But No Post-Reinforcement Pauses, 29 J. GAMBLING STUD. 661 (2013); 
see also Smith, supra note 148. 
153 Kevin A. Harrigan, Slot Machine Structural Characteristics: Creating Near 
Misses Using High Award Symbol Ratios, 6 INT'L J. OF MENTAL HEALTH 
ADDICTION 353, 353, 359 (2008) (discussing a 1989 Nevada Gaming Commission 
"ruling that the proprietary computer algorithms used by one slot machine 
manufacturer to create a high number of near misses on the payline [sic] are 
'unacceptable'"). A third tactic is the use of a "stop" button on a slot machine, 
which gives the player the illusion of control over the game and the result. Schull, 
supra note 123, at 83-84 (stating that, however, the outcome is determined even 
before the reels begin to spin). 
154 See SCHULL, supra note 123, at 275. 
155 See, e.g., id. at 278. 
156 See, e.g., id. 
157 Id. at 275; see Responsible Gaming, TECHLINK ENTM'T, http://www.tech 
linkentertainment.com/social-responsibilin;/ (last visited June 30, 2015). 
158 SCHULL, supra note 123, at 276. 
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development of ideas of how machine makers, and casinos, can be part of the 
solution rather than part of the problem is essential. No single measure will be 
perfect, and there will always be criticism of efforts to modify the gambling 
environment. Nevertheless, the concept of what it means to make a "better 
mousetrap"159 for machine gamblers can be changed. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The preceding discussion illustrates the many alternatives to SEPs, as a 
way of addressing addictive gambling behavior. Gaming industry 
representatives emphasize that most people play slot machines-even rapid-fire 
slot machines with near misses, false wins, and stop buttons-and do not 
develop gambling disorders. 160 According to this perspective, it is the 
psychological make-up of the gambler, not the machine, which produces the 
destructive, addictive behavior. 161 Yet, there is considerable research 
supporting the conclusion that addictive machine gambling is a function of 
some type of interaction between gambler and machine. As Schull says, "[t]he 
whole modus operandi of the industry is to approach the human being as 
something that's manipulable. So I find it disingenuous that they then tum 
around and argue that 100% of the responsibility for any harm is on the 
person."162 
In light of these interests, what is the proper balance to be struck between 
gamblers having responsibility for their own gambling behavior, and casinos 
not offering games that exploit addictive tendencies of certain gamblers? 
Regulators have an abundance of social science research to consider in 
addressing this question. 163 This research is ongoing and these behavioral 
159 See Schull, supra note 122. 
160 See Responsible Gaming, AM. GAMING Ass'N, http://www.american 
gaming.org/social-responsibility/responsible-gaming (last visited June 30, 2015) 
("Although the vast majority of Americans are able to gamble responsibly, a small 
percentage of people-approximately 1 percent of the adult population-cannot."). 
161 See generally DAVID STEWART, ROPES & GRAY, LLP, DEMYSTIFYING SLOT 
MACHINES AND THEIR IMPACT IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (2010), available at 
http://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/whitepapers/demy 
stifying_ slot_ machines_ and_ their_ impact. pdf. 
162 Brad Plumer, Slot Machine Science: How Casinos Get You to Spend More 
Money, VOX.COM (March 1, 2015), http://www.vox.com/2014/8/7/5976927/slot-
machines-casinos-addiction-by-design (quoting Natasha Dow Schull). 
163 One representative and excellent example is The Journal of Gambling 
Studies. Published quarterly, 
The Journal of Gambling Studies is an interdisciplinary forum for research 
and discussion of the many and varied aspects of gambling behavior, both 
controlled and pathological. Coverage extends to the wide range of 
attendant and resultant problems, including alcoholism, suicide, crime, and 
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findings need to inform the proper balance between industry accountability and 
gambler responsibility. A better understanding of the complex and tragic forces 
underlying problem gambling will likely only come about through careful 
research. 
Few people would argue that SEPs have no role in addressing problem 
gambling. But however structured, the limitations of SEPs are many. Efforts to 
refine SEPs may be appropriate, 164 though their systemic limitations will 
remain. 165 But attention to SEPs should not substitute for creative thinking 
about the gaming industry's role in promoting responsible gambling. There 
needs to be recognition that SEPs cannot continue to be the "predominant 
harm-reduction strategy used by the gaming industry."166 Meaningful inroads in 
diminishing the tragic effects of problem gambling will require commitments 
by both gamblers and the industry that go far beyond the gambler's decision to 
address his or her problem by self-excluding. 
a number of other mental health concerns. Articles published in this 
journal span a cross-section of disciplines including psychiatry, 
psychology, sociology, political science, criminology, and social work. 
About This Journal: Aims & Scope, J. OF GAMBLING STUD., http://link.springer. 
com/joumal/10899 (last visited June 30, 2015). 
164 For a discussion of how SEPs could take the fonn of an "unwelcome 
persons" list rather than a self-exclusion list, see William N. Thompson et al., 
Remedying the Lose-Lose Game of Compulsive Gambling: Voluntary Exclusions, 
Mandatory Exclusions, or an Alternative Method?, 40 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 
1221, 1255-57 (2007). 
165 As Carol O'Hare wrote: 
The more we try to revise and reshape these programs in response to 
everyone's questions, concerns, preferences, and legal challenges, the 
more complex, and possibly less effective they may become. And the 
more complex the programs, the more costly and difficult they will be to 
manage. The more difficult they are to manage, the easier it will be for 
gamblers to break the rules without being caught. And the less they get 
caught, the more they may exercise their denial by filing suit. 
In the long run, the greatest risk is that everyone will lose sight of why the 
programs were created in the first place-because someone who couldn't 
control his gambling wanted our help. 
O'Hare, supra note 65, at 191. 
166 Gainsbury, supra note 40, at 231. 
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APPENDIX 
Statewide Spouse/Family 
Prohibition on Removal from Term of 
State State Request Revocation of Collecting list Exclusion** Waiverof Mandated? Allowed? Privileges?** Winnings/Losses? J Exclusion? available?*** ** Li.ability? 
Colorado No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 3, 5, 10, Life Yes 
Delaware Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 1, 5, Life Yes 
Florida* Yes -- -- No --
Illinois Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 5, Life Yes 
Indiana Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 1,5,Life Yes 
Iowa Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Life Yes 
Kansas Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 2, Life Yes 
Louisiana Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 Yes 
Maine Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 1, 3, 5, Life Yes 
Maryland Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 2, Life Yes 
Michigan Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Life Yes 
Mississippi Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes167 5 -Life Yes 
Missouri Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes168 Life Yes 
Nevada* No I Yes 169 -- No 
New Jersey Yes No Yes Yes Yes  Yes 1, 5, Life Yes 
New Mexico Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 1, 3 5 Other Yes 
New York Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 1, 3, 5  Yes 
167 See 13-3 MISS. CODE R.§ 10.5(a) (LexisNexis 2015) (specifying that removal is automatic upon expiration of the term). 
168 See Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 11, § 45-17.060(1) (2015) (allowing petition to have the lifetime exclusion lifted after 5 
169 See NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 5. (requiring that each licensee in the issuance of check cashing, or the direct mail 
gaming opportunities, shall implement a program that allows patrons to self-limit their access to the issuance of check cashing, direct mail 
by the licensee). 
Spring 2015] SELF-EXCLUSION PROGRAMS 57 
Ohio Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 1, 5, life Yes 
Oklahoma* No -- -- -- No - - --
Pennsylvania Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 1, 5, life Yes 
Rhode Island* Yes -- -- -- No - -- --
South Dakota* No -- - -- - - -- --
West Virginia* No - -- -- - -- -- --
* Individual casino licensees and operators establish their own self-exclusion programs. 
**Revocation of privileges includes comps, issuance of credit, check cashing privileges, club memberships, etc. 
*** Removal procedures are never applicable to lifetime bans. 
**** Measured in years. 
